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Abstract 
Interacting with network externalities and switching costs, exclusive dealings for premium contents in digital 
broadcasting markets allow incumbents to deny rivals critical mass and profitable market entry. A downstream 
company that acquires the exclusive rights to high-quality programming in the upstream market may obtain a 
competitive advantage over its rivals which suffer from negative externalities. Instead of fostering competition 
and innovation, exclusive licensing serves as an effective entry-deterrent strategy in order to preserve market 
power and to leverage monopolies. Although exclusivity for premium content has long been considered the 
only  way  for  guaranteeing  the  remuneration  of  the  vast  investments  in  content  production  and  platform 
infrastructure, this paper  challenges the profitability of  this exclusivity  strategy in network industries. The 
paper questions the traditional economic assumptions underlying exclusivity of content and argues that the 
increasing emergence of multi-sided platforms in the broadcasting industry creates incentives for right holders 
to multi-home rather than single-home their contents. 
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1. Introduction 
The widespread diffusion of digital delivery networks and reception equipment in the broadcasting industry 
has fundamentally reshaped the production, distribution and consumption of media content. As innovation in 
information technology has a disruptive impact on media ecosystems and business models, digitisation and 
convergence facilitate a shift away from the classical vertical layer model into the converged layered industry 
(Fransman, 2002, 2010). Technological advances have induced a modularised structure of industry demanding 
vertical  specialisation  rather  than  vertical  integration.  As  transaction  costs  have  decreased  thanks  to  the 
Internet, firms are likely to replace their vertical integrated businesses with market relations and focus on one 
particular activity in the market. This modularisation of skills and capabilities will ultimately result into the deconstruction of the communications industries with the formation of strategic alliance partnerships as a 
means of accessing resources and competences (Li & Whalley, 2002). Such a modular architecture facilitates 
entry of newcomers in all layers by allowing them simply to focus on core activities, and enhances competition 
and innovation in all industry layers. Consequently, Internet service providers and mobile network operators 
have entered the broadcasting market by exploiting pay-television platforms and launching mobile television 
services as part of their multi-play strategy. 
Owing to this modularisation of value chains, stand-alone firms are incapable of exploring and exploiting all 
competencies and components required for developing and producing full-service information goods. In the 
digital economy, value is co-created by a series of partnerships in a value network, in which stakeholders – 
suppliers, allies and even consumers – join forces, innovate and co-produce value. Value networks should be 
understood as a set of relative autonomous business units that are managed independently, but co-create on 
the basis of bilateral service agreements (Malecki & Moriset, 2008). Since the company’s competitive position 
is mainly based on its system of relationships, a performing network should be composed of interconnected 
complementary nodes. According to Norman and Ramirez (1993), “the key strategic task is the reconfiguration 
of roles and relationships among this constellation of actors in order to mobilize the creation of value in new 
forms”. The importance of strategic alliances has been illustrated during the recent HD-DVD vs Blu-ray format 
war, in which consortia representing consumer electronics, computer hardware and movie studios went head-
to-head for establishing the industry standard. The winning format was not necessarily technological superior, 
but was supported by an impressive consortium and proved compatible with successful hardware devices such 
as Sony’s PlayStation 3, which produced network externalities in favour of the Blu-ray format. 
Historically, gatekeepers such as network operators used to create monopolies and bottlenecks as market 
power was largely derived from controlling stakes over the distribution stage. Today, traditional scarcity has 
changed into an era of plenty characterised by abundance of information and consumer choice. As established 
broadcasting companies have fear of losing their historical grown dominance over production and especially 
distribution modalities, more critical voices argue that these incumbents have started deploying strategies for 
preserving market power, creating scarcity and reinventing bottlenecks (Mansell, 1999, 2004). One strategy to 
deal with this increasing market uncertainty is the exclusive acquisition of premium content. Content bundling 
forms an essential part of the value proposition to consumers, but access to compelling content is considered a 
major  bottleneck  for  alternative  service  providers  as  incumbent  platform  operators  have  signed  exclusive 
dealings with right holders. Although exclusivity for premium content has long been considered the only way 
for guaranteeing the remuneration of the vast investments in content production and platform infrastructure, 
this paper challenges the profitability of this exclusivity strategy in network industries by means of a literature 
review. The paper questions the traditional economic assumptions underlying exclusivity of content and argues 
that the increasing emergence of multi-sided platforms in the broadcasting industry creates incentives for right 
holders to multi-home rather than single-home their contents. 
The paper is structured as follows. The first section briefly introduces the platform concept and discusses 
why network externalities may give rise to demand-side economies of scale and ‘winner takes all markets’. 
Afterwards,  the  importance  of  premium  content  for  overcoming  the  ‘chicken-and-egg’  problem  and  for developing sustainable business models is highlighted. Moreover, the plusses and minuses of exclusive dealings 
in  two-sided  markets  are  discussed.  The  final  section  then  argues  why  non-exclusive  arrangements  in 
externality-driven industries may provide benefits for content producers, platform operators and viewers, and 
discusses the move towards the platform-based broadcasting model. 
 
2.  Network externalities in platform industries 
Digital information technology radically affects the exchange of goods, services and information in society, 
foreseeing a major impact on the distribution channels and on the vertical organisation of the communications 
industries. Since digital access network infrastructure has become vital for carrying multimedia content and 
applications,  platform-based  intermediaries  have  increasingly  gained  importance  (Illing  &  Peitz,  2006).  In 
general, two polar types of intermediaries can be distinguished: one-sided merchants and two-sided platforms 
(Hagiu, 2007). In the merchant mode, intermediaries acquire goods from  sellers either on a wholesale or 
consignment basis and resell them to buyers. Generally, right holders sell premium content outright to pay-
television  operators  while  consumers  pay  for  accessing  this  content.  This  business  model  opposes  to  the 
platform model that allows affiliated sellers to sell directly to affiliated buyers. Consider video on demand 
applications such as YouTube, whereby content is affiliated with the platform and income is shared among the 
content  provider  and  the  platform  owner  (Evens,  in  press).  In  the  networked  broadcasting  system, 
intermediation  thus  increasingly  takes  place  through  multi-sided  platforms  and  partnership  models. 
Broadcasting  platform  infrastructures  encompass  several  roles  (see  figure  1),  distinguishing  between  (1) 
demand-side  users  (viewers),  (2)  supply-side  users  (content  providers),  (3)  platform  owners  (content 
aggregators)  and  (4)  platform  sponsors  (technology  support)(Eisenmann,  Parker  &  Van  Alstyne,  2008). 
Platforms are regarded as structuring elements in the fluid media ecosystem, whose overall performance is 
derived from the coordination and the cross-subsidisation of network externalities between different markets 
through a common platform, treating one side of the market as the profit centre (subsidising) and the other as 
a loss leader (subsidised). 
  
Figure 1: Typology of platform roles 
In multi-sided platform markets, value is not created in the transformation of goods, but in their mediation 
between different kinds of users, who pay for access to the network. The value a platform generates increases 
with the number of users that join the network. Such networks compete to capture rents from consumption 
externalities that give rise to demand-side economies of scale and ‘winners takes all’ markets (Katz & Shapiro, 
1985; Shapiro & Varian, 1999). In this context, exclusivity provisions can interact with network effects to create 
substantial entry barriers, especially when switching costs for demand-side users are considerable (Klemperer, 
1987). In two-sided markets, incumbents aim for signing up content providers exclusively so as to prevent 
multi-homing (affiliation to multiple platforms), and extract the full network benefits from users. As exclusivity 
in  information  markets  operates  on  an  even  grander  scale  with  network  effects  than  with  conventional 
economics, demand-scale economies allow incumbent companies to exclude other platforms to deny rivals 
critical mass to profitably enter markets and exploit platforms (Doganoglu & Wright, 2010; Shapiro, 1999). A 
downstream company that acquires the exclusive rights to high-quality programming in the upstream market 
may  obtain  a  competitive  advantage  over  its  rivals  which  suffer  from  negative  externalities  (Harbord  & 
Ottaviani, 2001). When network effects are there, the demand for a product or service depends not only on its 
price but also on the expected number of other users. Since television programming has conversational value 
as well, which is increased with every additional viewer, the exclusive coverage of major events such as the 
Olympics may generate positive social network externalities and may create incentives for people to subscribe 
to the particular platform (Boardman & Hargreaves-Heap, 1999). 
Indirect network externalities are at the heart of the celebrated ‘chicken-and-egg’ problem, which refers to 
a lack of incentives for platform investment. Platform operators should break the vicious circle that is hindering 
the platform’s development: producers need consumers, who need compelling content at their turn (Parker & 
Van Alstyne, 2005). Whereas supply-side users are reluctant to invest in often expensive content  when  a 
substantial consumer base is not certain yet, uncertainty about available content hinders end-users to join the 
network. Coexistence of these processes may lead to absence of network externalities and lack of incentives for the platform’s development (Evans & Schmalensee, 2009). Hence, much attention should be devoted to 
business model design issues to break this circle by matching stakeholder expectations in order to make money 
(Rochet & Tirole, 2003). In this context, pricing and content bundling are regarded as critical components in the 
value proposition of broadcasting platforms. Failures of recent technologies such as DAB or CD-I and the format 
wars for VCR and DVD have shown that the availability of attractive content crucially determines the success of 
a technology. The adage ‘content is king’ thus still prevails, especially in an essentially top-down industry as 
television. The increase of network capacity and the homogeneous transmission quality of networks “imply 
that consumers’ preferences tend to be driven by content rather than technology much more than before” 
(Nicita & Rossi, 2008). High-quality, premium content, characterised by excessive rights fees such as live sports 
and Hollywood blockbusters, has proven its strategic importance in helping digital television platforms to build 
a  substantial  subscriber  base.  However,  access  to  must-have  content  has  become  a  major  bottleneck  for 
alternative platforms as incumbents and first movers are raising substantial entry barriers for newcomers by 
implementing  tying  and  bundling  strategies  (Evens  et  al.,  in  press).  Introductory  offers  including  premium 
programming are used by first movers attempting to increase consumer demand for their platforms. In two-
sided  markets,  when  such  exclusive  deals  are  not  offered,  incumbents  would  eventually  lose  out  when 
competing operators launch superior platforms, which may be able to capture externality rents. 
For new entrants in the market, rights ownership of premium content functions as a significant competitive 
advantage for attracting a substantial customer base and for resolving the chicken-and-egg problem. Owing to 
the intensified struggle for market share among platform operators, premium rights for mega sports events 
and major competitions have heavily inflated. NBC won the USA rights to the 2010 and 2012 Olympics for 
$2.001 billion representing a 33% boost from the $1.508 billion bid for the 2006-2008 Games. This exponential 
increase in acquisition costs is generated by incumbent pay-television operators’ requests for exclusivity and 
their strategy to foreclose the market. This finding may be opposite to the traditional assumption according to 
which exclusivity  was the  consequence and not the origin of the excessive costs observed for purchasing 
premium content (Wachtmeister, 1998). The exclusive coverage of live sports encourages people to invest in 
reception equipment and acts as a loss leader to attract a higher amount of long-term subscribers. Instead of 
fostering competition and innovation, however, exclusive licensing for premium content raises rival’s costs, 
creates entry barriers and leads to a market inefficient outcome. This supports earlier findings that bundling 
denies rivals scale and serves as an effective entry-deterrent strategy in order to preserve market power and to 
leverage monopolies (Aghion & Bolton, 1987; Carlton & Waldman, 2002; Nalebuff, 2004; Whinston, 1990). 
 
3.  Exclusive dealings in broadcasting 
As mentioned, acquisition of premium contents is seen as primary means of differentiation and competition 
between platforms for consumer adoption. However, the overall extent of exclusivity depends from industry to 
industry. In the videogames market, for example, games of all major publishers are available to each console 
(Sony PlayStation 3, Microsoft’s Xbox, Nintendo Wii and PC), except for those few games produced or bought 
out by hardware manufacturers to solve the chicken-and-egg problem. Whereas EA Sports affiliates to each 
platform, blockbusters such as Gran Turismo and Toy Story exclusively contracts with the PlayStation 3 system. In the broadcasting industry, however, exclusivity for premium contents has long been considered the only 
effective way for stimulating investments in content production and platform development. As European pay-
television and later digital platform operators started exploiting business models based on a set-top box system 
providing conditional access to encrypted content, premium contents helped to differentiate pay-television 
offerings from free-to-air broadcasters. Consequently, content producers have re-arranged licensing schemes 
in exclusive time windows in order to expand market power and to optimise the lifecycle management of their 
contents. By using exclusive windows, premium right holders aim to limit content availability benefiting from 
scarcity. Such windows, in which value is driven by a unique matrix of time, exclusivity, differential pricing and 
repeat consumption, allow maximising profits in separate markets and consecutively releasing content licenses 
for particular markets and purposes as theatrical exhibition, home video, pay-per-view, pay-television and free-
to-air television (Ulin, 2009). The limited competitive structure of each layer within the European pay-television 
market has induced a fundamental transformation from ‘exclusive windows’ to ‘exclusive dealings’ as Nicita 
and Ramello (2005) argue. The original exclusive window assigned for the use of particular contents by pay-
television operators was interpreted as the right accorded to the incumbent operator to broadcast content to 
subscribers on an exclusive basis. Exclusivity contracts are thus not inherent in pay-television markets, but are 
the outcome of competitive strategies deployed by first movers to foreclose the market. 
Advocates of content exclusivity have argued that exclusive agreements can improve overall efficiency as 
they minimise transaction costs, protect brand names and protect intellectual property from free-riding. Given 
operators’ large sunk costs in equipment and platform investment, the exclusive purchasing is an effective way 
for persuading viewers to subscribe and for recouping the huge costs sustained for acquiring premium content. 
Broadcasters and platforms see exclusive dealings as a means for building up audiences, increasing advertising 
and sponsorship revenues and gaining public prestige. Furthermore, exclusivity of contents helps operators in 
differentiating  themselves  from  competitors  and  even  allows  them  to  generate  additional  revenues  from 
granting sublicenses to competing channels. For content producers and sport organisers on the other hand, the 
exclusive selling of broadcasting rights is assumed to guarantee a maximum short-term profitability as the price 
paid for exclusivity by one broadcaster probably exceeds the sum of amounts that would be paid by several 
broadcasters for non-exclusive rights. The more intense the competition on the demand-side, the higher the 
acquisition prices for broadcasters and the higher the return for rights holders will be (Wachtmeister, 1998). 
Hogendorn and Yuen (2009) have found that a must-have content provider such as Disney’s ESPN for US pay-
television operators is more likely to  sign exclusive access contracts with a single platform if the content 
popularity is high, market share differences between platforms are high and platform compatibility is low. 
However, as the marginal cost for content providers to broadcast on multiple platforms is negligibly small and 
compatibility  thus  high,  these  findings  suggest  that  content  providers  are  better  off  with  non-exclusive 
contracts. 
Since exclusivity contracts have transformed the pay-television business in a ‘competition for the market’ 
model where the winner takes all, the network externalities generated by these exclusivity contracts have 
raised antitrust concerns in Europe. Although exclusivity is a widely accepted practice in the broadcasting 
industry and in itself does not breach the principles of free and fair competition, such dealings have raised the attention  of  competition  authorities  both  on  economic  and  social  arguments.  Exclusivity  dealings  are  an 
essential component of the pre-emption strategy deployed by dominant upstream and downstream firms as 
they may raise rivals’ costs, deter efficient entry and therefore foreclose markets. Combined with substantial 
switching costs for both supply-side and demand-side users, strong network effects can induce chicken-and-egg 
problems for alternative platform operators as they might hinder reaching critical mass. Consequently, this 
scenario may in part explain the delay in investments in and the roll-out of alternative network infrastructures 
such as fiber optic cable and digital terrestrial television in many European countries. Exclusive dealings may 
thus  hinder  innovation  and  competition  as  they  create  entry  barriers  for  the  development  of  alternative 
platforms (Nicita & Ramello, 2005). Recently, UK’s biggest pay-television provider BSkyB was forced by the 
telecommunications regulator Ofcom to make two of its Sky Sports channels available to competing cable and 
terrestrial television providers at significantly reduced wholesale prices. The decision fell after four competing 
platforms had complained that BSkyB’s control of broadcasting rights was creating a vicious circle hindering 
competition and keeping prices artificially high. Ofcom argued that BSkyB was using its market power in the 
wholesale supply of their premium channels to limit distribution to rivals, therefore driving up access prices, 
limiting consumer choice and restricting platform innovation (Ofcom, 2010). Contrary to Weeds (2007) stating 
that subscribers are better off under exclusive distribution as exclusivity intensifies price competition to the 
benefit of consumers, others (Armstrong, 1999; Doganoglu & Wright, 2010; Harbord & Ottaviani, 2001) argue 
that a ban on exclusive dealings would intensify downstream competition and transfer the social benefits of 
premium  programming  from  firms  to  consumers.  Whereas  exclusive  arrangements  may  harm  consumer 
welfare at the expense of industry profits, non-exclusive distribution remains the welfare optimum as the 
largest group of consumers has access to premium programming and especially events of major importance for 
society (Hagiu & Lee, in press). 
 
4.  Towards a platform-based broadcasting model 
Exclusivity for premium programming has long been considered the only effective way for guaranteeing the 
remuneration of the vast investments in content production and platform infrastructure. Exclusivity creates 
incentives for right holders to produce innovative and high-quality content, ensures that service providers have 
access to popular content and reduces the risk that platform operators get stuck in a chicken-and-egg problem. 
The European pay-television business suffers from bloody bidding wars for the acquisition of premium rights 
that are exclusively tied to the winner (e.g. Leandros & Tsourvakas, 2004). Owing to considerable sunk costs in 
platform development and content acquisition, the market tends towards fierce competition and monopoly 
structures. However, as argued by Evens (in press), exclusive rights purchase reflects the one-sided merchant 
mode and leaves no opportunities for a multiplatform strategy as other parties are denied access to crowd-
pulling supply. Value creation in broadcasting markets is changing as content is progressively being rented 
through licensed access rather than being bought by platform operators. Given the slight transition towards 
externality-driven platforms and the rise of the retail model (pay-per-view), questions have arisen whether 
exclusive dealings really are the most profitable strategy for premium programming producers (Armstrong, 
1999; Balto, 1999). Regarding exclusivity, content producers and platform operators might have diverging interests. Both aim 
for the maximisation of profits and return on investment, but strategies for achieving these goals may oppose. 
Whereas content producers should strive for maximal diffusion of their contents across all available platforms 
in order to capture network rents, platform owners are willing to acquire exclusive contents in order to raise 
entry barriers, foreclose markets and preserve market power. So far, right owners have sold broadcasting rights 
to the highest-bidding platform on an exclusive basis. This has long been interpreted as the most optimal 
strategy for both actors, but regulators are increasingly taking into account the interests of consumers that are 
denied access to premium programming as rights are held exclusively by another service provider. Regulators 
and competition authorities are considering different models for access to contents with special attention to 
the  effect  on  producers’  incentives  to  invest  in  content  production,  new  entrants’  incentives  to  invest  in 
alternative platforms, incumbents’ dominant position and viewer interests (Nicita & Rossi, 2008). Apart from 
regulatory interventions (such as in the BSkyB case) aimed at creating more open and competitive markets, it is 
argued in this paper that premium programming producers and even platform operators should innovate their 
business models in order to benefit from the rise of externality-driven platforms and enhance innovation both 
in contents and technology. 
It is doubtful whether platform operators and gatekeepers will lose total grip on the selection, aggregation 
and transmission of broadcasting content in the future, but bargaining power will increasingly shift towards 
premium  content  producers  and  right  holders  as  technological  convergence  is  creating  abundance  in  the 
distribution layer. As foreclosing portions of externality-based industries is inefficient and too costly for content 
producers  as  they  strive  for  maximal  diffusion,  affiliating  with  several  platforms  would  entail  profit 
maximisation if they get paid on a per-user fee basis. Content producers may sell their contents outright to 
platform operators when there is a high degree of complementarity among sellers’ products. In the case of 
high-quality  content,  Hagiu  and  Lee  (in  press)  argue  that  right  holders  might  profit  from  a  multi-homing 
strategy. Whereas exclusivity of mid-quality content can soften price competition at the platform level, low-
quality content should multi-home as it does not yield any competitive advantage. Increasingly, right holders, 
especially  in  the  sports  business,  are  exploring  this  shared  access  to  premium  contents  and  provide  non-
exclusive  content  to  multimedia  platforms  that  can  be  accessed  by  means  of  extra  payments.  The  digital 
channel Eredivisie Live, broadcasting games of the Dutch soccer’s top-tier league, acts as an interesting case. 
Instead  of  selling  its  rights  exclusively  to  the  highest-bidding  platform,  the  league  managed  to  agree 
distribution  deals  with  all  operators  (cable,  satellite,  terrestrial,  xDSL)  but  ceded  control  of  pricing  to  the 
platforms. The channel is produced by Endemol Sports and aims to reach as many viewers as possible and 
therefore  is  not  exclusive  for  one  particular  platform,  but  it  cannot  influence  the  pricing.  In  return,  the 
distribution deals are thought to include revenue-share agreements. Following the Dutch example, the French 
football league released its plan to start its own dedicated pay-television channel. The service will run alongside 
existing contracts with Orange and Canal+. Contrary to Eredivisie Live, the French league aims to prepare for 
the possibility that Orange will not bid for future broadcast rights so that Canal+ would become the sole bidder 
for television rights to French premier league matches in 2012 (which would depreciate the value of all rights 
packages). Such a business model based on shared access to premium contents and on royalties paid by the platforms 
for each viewing would allow producers’ revenues to grow with the number of viewings and the multiplatform 
diffusion of the contents (Nicita & Ramello, 2005). Removing exclusivity as artificial barrier would generate 
incentives for technological innovation and the development of alternative broadcasting platforms, and would 
move competitive advantage from exclusivity of content to pricing, quality of service, programming variety and 
innovative features. The dominant position of a platform should not only rely on the exclusive provision of 
premium content and on the timing of its market entry, but on its whole value proposition including customer 
support, ease of use, product innovativeness, interoperability etc. Exclusive arrangements are now used by first 
movers to limit scale of alternative providers and to push them out of the pay-television market. Dominant 
positions as a result of network externalities may induce monopolistic behaviour and may dampen incumbent’s 
incentives to invest in customer service quality and technological innovation in the long term. As they fear 
cannibalisation of their businesses by new media services, incumbents often hold back premium rights as part 
of their pre-emption strategy. For consumers, non-exclusive arrangements would allow for getting access to 
premium contents from any single delivery platform and reduces switching costs between platforms as an 
industry barrier. As Rochet and Tirole  (2003) contend, competitive pricing on one side of the market depends 
on  the  extent  of  multihoming  on  the  other  side  of  the  market.  Non-exclusive  distribution  intensifies 
downstream competition and should thus result into lower subscription prices. Consequently, more people 
would go digital so that both platform operators and broadcasters will benefit from increased consumer uptake 
and expenses. In such a platform-based broadcasting model, operators would have open shared access to high-
quality content, premium right holders would maximise profits from capturing network rents and consumers 
would have equal access to an optimal variety of contents. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
For years, national regulators have been demanded by European Directives to implement legislation aimed 
at encouraging new market entries and at creating incentives for more intense competition and lower prices in 
telecommunications industries. Local loop unbundling has been used for allowing market entrants to employ 
the incumbent’s fixed infrastructure without the need for rolling out proprietary networks and for supporting 
the proliferation of alternative delivery platforms. In countries where digital broadcasting has a considerable 
high market penetration,  such as France and Spain, this entry policy has been a key factor allowing IPTV 
newcomers to develop advanced services. However, network externalities have induced monopoly power to 
first movers leaving entrants little opportunities to develop competing offers since access to premium contents 
has  become  one  of  the  major  bottlenecks  for  alternative  providers.  Hence,  network  regulation  should  be 
considered as a first step towards an open market, but should be accompanied by content regulation, which 
should result into equal access to premium contents for all market players. As bargaining power has changed 
from  distributors  to  right  holders,  regulatory  attention  has  shifted  to  control  over  content.  Following  the 
network neutrality principle, regulatory interventions aim at creating incentives to invest in the development of 
competing delivery networks and at granting access to incumbent operators’ exclusive offerings. In general, 
such  interventions  should  meet  three  important  public  policy  objectives  (Nicita  &  Rossi,  2008).  First, regulations should be aimed at balancing the interests of right holders and distributors and at maximising 
incentives for content production and content distribution. Second, regulatory interventions should stimulate 
investments in technological innovation and network capacity, and should be aimed at establishing maximal 
quality of service to final customers of both incumbents and newcomers. Third, as foreclosure strategies used 
by incumbent operators may hamper free competition in network markets, antitrust regulations should focus 
on restraining dominant positions in order to enhance competition in terms of increased consumer choice and 
lower prices. 
With respect to exclusive dealings, European and national competition authorities dispose of a wide array 
of regulatory instruments for securing competition in the market. Given the increasing number of merger cases 
in the media sector, regulators are accepting remedies foreseeing the granting of access to essential inputs or 
access to specific content to third parties on a non-discriminatory and transparent basis, better known as must-
offer obligations. Dominant operators such as BSkyB have been mandated to provide must-have content to 
alternative infrastructure operators either on a wholesale or retail basis. Such remedy should lower barriers for 
entering the pay-television market and enhance ‘competition in the market’. As a response to unique selling 
units, content sharing in the form of purchasing pools or sublicensing agreements has become another popular 
model for gaining access to content. By establishing buying pools, broadcasters and platforms aim to control 
the  huge  price  increases  for  premium  contents  and  allow  that  premium  content  is  spread  alongside 
competitors.  Numerous  examples  in  the  broadcasting  field  may  show  that  firms  are  increasingly  ceding 
exclusive control over contents as the online and illegal distribution of content is undermining the value of the 
window systems. In addition to regulatory interventions, content producers and broadcasters may proceed to 
the non-exclusive distribution of premium contents. By spreading their contents over as many platforms as 
possible, right holders are able to capture network rents whereas non-exclusive distribution of contents may 
allow  platform  operators  to  spend  fewer  resources  for  content  acquisition  and  allocate  budgets  to 
technological innovation and customer support. In the future, digital broadcasting markets will become more 
open and competitive advantage will shift from content exclusivity to quality of service, innovativeness and 
pricing. As all providers should have equal access to high-quality content, pay-television operators and digital 
broadcasting platforms should be able to really compete in the market. 
 
6.  References 
Aghion, P. & Bolton, P. (1987). Contracts as a Barrier to Entry. American Economic Review, 77(3), 388-410. 
Armstrong, M. (1999). Competition in the Pay-TV Market. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 
13(4), 257-280. 
Balto, D. (1999). Networks and exclusivity: antitrust analysis to promote network competition. George Mason 
Law Review, 7, 523-576. 
Boardman, A.E. & Hargreaves-Heap, S.P. (1999). Network externalities and government restrictions on satellite 
broadcasting of key sporting events. Journal of Cultural Economics, 23(3), 167-181. 
Carlton, D.W. & Waldman, M. (2002). The Strategic Use of Tying to Preserve and Create Market Power in 
Evolving Industries. RAND Journal of Economics, 33(2), 194-220. Doganoglu, T. & Wright, J. (2010). Exclusive dealing with network effects. International Journal of Industrial 
Organization 28(2), 145-154. 
Eisenmann,  T.R.;  Parker,  G.  &  Van  Alstyne,  M.  (2008).  Opening  platforms:  how,  when  and  why?,  Harvard 
Business School Working Paper. 
Evans, D.S. & Schmalensee, R. (2009). Failure to launch:  Critical Mass in Platform Businesses, Harvard Business 
School Working Paper. 
Evens, T. (in press). Value networks and changing business models for the digital television industry. Journal of 
Media Business Studies. 
Evens, T.; Lefever, K.; Valcke, P.; Schuurman, D. & De Marez, L. (in press). Access to premium content on mobile 
television platforms: The case of mobile sports. Telematics and Informatics. 
Fransman, M. (2002). Mapping the evolving telecoms industry: the uses and shortcomings of the layer model. 
Telecommunications Policy, 26(9-10), 473-483. 
Fransman, M. (2010). The new ICT ecosystem. Implications for policy and regulation. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Hagiu, A. (2007). Merchant or two-sided platform. Review of Network Economics, 6(2), 115-133. 
Hagiu, A. & Lee, R.S. (in press). Exclusivity and control. Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. 
Harbord, D. & Ottaviani, M. (2001). Contracts and competition in the pay-TV market, London Business School 
Working Paper. 
Hogendorn, C. & Yuen, K.Y. (2009). Platform competition with 'must-have' components. Journal of Industrial 
Economics, 57(2), 294-318. 
Illing, G. & Peitz, M. (Eds.). (2006). Industrial organization and the digital economy. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Katz, M.L. & Shapiro, C. (1985). Network externalities, competition, and compatibility. The American Economic 
Review, 75(3), 424-440. 
Klemperer, P. (1987). Markets with consumers' switching costs. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102(2), 375-
394. 
Leandros,  N.  &  Tsourvakas,  G.  (2004).  Intensive  competition  and  company  failures  in  subscription  pay 
television: some European experiences, 6th World Media Economics Conference. Montréal, Canada. 
Li, F. & Whalley, J. (2002). Deconstruction of the telecommunications industry: from value chains to value 
networks. Telecommunications Policy, 26(9-10), 451-472. 
Malecki,  E.J.  &  Moriset,  B.  (2008).  The  digital  economy:  business  organization,  production  processes  and 
regional developments. New York: Routledge. 
Mansell, R. (1999). New media competition and access. The scarcity-abundance dialectic. New Media & Society, 
1(2), 155-182. 
Mansell, R. (2004). Political Economy, Power and New Media. New Media & Society, 6(1), 96-105. 
Nalebuff, B. (2004). Bundling as an entry barrier. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(1), 159-187. 
Nicita, A. & Ramello, G.B. (2005). Exclusivity and antitrust in media markets: the case of pay-TV in Europe. 
International Journal of the Economics of Business, 12(3), 371-387. Nicita, A. & Rossi, M.A. (2008). Access to audio-visual contents, exclusivity and anticommons in new media 
markets. Communications & Strategies, 71(3), 79-101. 
Norman,  R.  &  Ramírez,  R.  (1993).  From  value  chain  to  value  constellation:  designing  interactive  strategy. 
Harvard Business Review, 71(7-8), 65-77. 
Ofcom. (2010). Pay TV statement. London: Office of Communications. 
Parker, G.G. & Van Alstyne, M.W. (2005). Two-sided network effects: a theory of information product design. 
Management Science 51(10), 1494-1504. 
Rochet, J.-C. & Tirole, J. (2003). Platform competition in two-sided markets. Journal of the European Economic 
Association, 1(4), 990-1029. 
Shapiro, C. (1999). Exclusivity in network industries. George Mason Law Review, 7, 674-683. 
Shapiro, C. & Varian, H.R. (1999).  Information Rules  - A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy. Boston: 
Harvard Business School Press. 
Ulin, J.C. (2009). The business of media distribution. Monetizing film, TV and video content in an online world. 
Oxford: Focal Press. 
Wachtmeister, A.-M. (1998). Broadcasting of sports events and competition law. Competition Policy Newsletter, 
5(2), 18-28. 
Weeds, H. (2007). TV Wars: Exclusive Content and Platform Competition in Pay TV, 5
th International Workshop 
on Media Economics. Bologna, Italy. 
Whinston, M.D. (1990). Tying Foreclosure, and Exclusion. American Economic Review, 80(4), 837-859. 